We study oligopolistic …rms'incentives to share customer information about past purchase history in a situation where …rms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer considers the product o¤erings complements or substitutes. By addressing this new type of behavior-based price discrimination, we show that both the incentive to share customer information and its e¤ects on consumers depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences. This paper has important implications for merger analysis when the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another …rm's customer lists. We also …nd that the informational regime in which …rms reside can have an in ‡uence upon the choice of product di¤erentiation.
Introduction
In this paper we study oligopolistic …rms'incentives to share customer information about past purchase history. More speci…cally, we consider a situation in which the relationship (i.e., the degree of substitutability or complementarity) between the product o¤erings by oligopolistic …rms is customer-speci…c, private information unknown to the …rms. Goods are substitutes for some customers and complements for others. The air travel and rental car services, for instance, can be complements for some travelers who use both modes of transportation in the same trip. However, they can be substitutes for others, especially shortto medium-distance travelers. 1 Another example is the relationship between printed versions of novels and motion picture adaptations. For some consumers they can be competing products whereas for other consumers they can be complements. 2 The sharing of customer-speci…c transaction records allows the …rms to update information about a particular consumer's preference towards the products. In such a setup, we analyze the …rms' incentives to share customer information, and the impact of such sharing on market competition. These questions are especially relevant in electronic commerce, where consumers'records of previous purchases can be easily traced and stored by electronic "…ngerprints." 3 Our study also has important implications for merger analysis when the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another …rm's customer lists.
We consider a simple two-period model to address the issues related to inter-…rm information sharing. Each …rm collects information about its own sales record. As a result, at the end of the …rst period, each …rm acquires information concerning whether or not a particular individual has bought a unit of its own product through its …rst-period marketing.
In the absence of information sharing, however, each …rm remains uncertain over whether the customer has also bought a unit of the other …rm's product. In contrast, with information sharing each …rm can learn the complete history of the past transaction record of a 1 More people rent a car and drive to their destinations as airport security inspections have become more of a hassle following the 9/11 terrorist attack. speci…c consumer. The aggregation of customer lists allows the …rms to infer whether that customer considers the goods substitutes or complements. We analyze how this customerspeci…c information concerning the relationship of the two products can be used as a basis for price discrimination in the second period.
The analysis of the e¤ects of information sharing on market competition and each …rm's incentives to share information with other …rms is complicated because the other …rms, with whom the customer information might be shared, could be potential rivals in the substitute market and at the same time partners in the complementary market, depending on consumer types. We show that the incentive to share customer information depends crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complement and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences for the two products. The intuition for this result is as follows.
With information sharing, the …rms can distinguish consumers who consider the two products complementary from those who consider them substitutes. As a result, they charge di¤erent prices depending on consumer types. For consumers who consider the two products complementary, the two …rms tend to set too high prices with information sharing from the viewpoint of joint pro…t maximization. This is due to the Cournot e¤ect in the complementary monopoly problem. The two …rms could have obtained a higher pro…t by cooperatively lowering their individual prices as if they were a merged monopolist. This ine¢ ciency in a noncooperative equilibrium occurs because the two …rms do not internalize the interdependence of their pricing strategies. In contrast, for consumers who consider the two products substitutes, the two …rms charge too little with information sharing from the perspectives of joint pro…t maximization due to competition. Without information sharing, each …rm who maximizes its expected pro…t must post a single price which is the (weighted) average of the prices that would have prevailed under information sharing. Suppose that the price for consumers who regard the products as substitutes is lower than that for consumers who consider them complementary under information sharing. Then, the average price mitigates the externality problem in the complementary markets. In addition, the average pricing relaxes competition in the substitute market enabling the …rms to extract more rents. On both accounts, the …rms are better o¤ without information sharing. Of course, if we consider the other case where the full information price in the substitute market is higher than that in the complementary market, information sharing leads to a higher pro…t in the opposite manner.
The e¤ect of information sharing on consumers also di¤ers across consumer types, and depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of full information prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute markets. For instance, when the full information price in the substitute market is higher than that in the complementary market, information sharing bene…ts consumers who regard the two products as complements, but hurts those who regard them as substitutes. The impact on consumers is reversed if the full information price in the substitute market is lower than that in the complementary market.
The intuition for our main result also provides a new perspective on the determinants of the degree of product di¤erentiation. Firms potentially face a trade-o¤ between a higher pro…t associated with highly di¤erentiated goods in the substitute market and the potentially aggravated externality problem in the complementary market when information sharing is banned and the …rms are forced to charge one price. This implies that the informational regime in which …rms reside can in ‡uence the choice of product di¤erentiation.
Our basic model analyzes direct exchange of customer information between the …rms in the market. Our analysis, however, also has implications for other channels of information aggregation. For instance, our analysis suggests a new role of middlemen -the intermediaries between the seller of a good and its potential buyers -as information aggregators. If the direct exchange of customer information between …rms is banned due to either privacy concerns or antitrust reasons, the presence of middlemen such as Amazon, eBay, or Google check-out can bene…t …rms and some consumers by functioning as lawful institutions that facilitate information aggregation. To the best of our knowledge, this role of middlemen
has not yet been addressed. 4 In addition, our model provides a new rationale for merger in which the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another …rm's customer lists rather than its real assets. 5 Even if a merger does not lead to greater market-power or cost-synergies such as the elimination of duplicative production and marketing expenses, it still can be a pro…table strategy due to the value of customer lists held by its merger partner. The recent acquisition of CDNow by 4 See Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) and Yavas (1994) for an analysis of middlemen as an intermediary to reduce transaction costs in bilateral search economies with trade frictions. 5 Customer information is one of the intangible assets acquired through a merger, according to 'Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (October 2004)' by the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.htm). However, there is no formal analysis that recognizes the customer list as a primary driver of merger.
Bertelsmann is a case in point. CDNow, a web-based startup company founded in February 1994, publicly announced that its cash assets were only su¢ cient to sustain another six months of operations in March 2000. Its major asset was its customer list of 3.29 million people in June 2000; it did not have substantial physical assets like other online retailers.
In July 2000, however, Bertelsmann acquired CDNow for $117 million in an all-cash deal appreciating the value of CDNow's customer base. 6 Our study can o¤er a theoretical foundation for the M&A of a …rm whose only asset is its customer lists in the context of behavior-based price discrimination. 7 Our paper is related to two strands of literature: information sharing and behaviorbased price discrimination. There is by now an extensive literature that studies the issue of information sharing between oligopolistic …rms concerning market demand and production cost. For example, Clarke (1983) , Crawford and Sobel (1982) , Gal-Or (1984 , 1985 , and Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982) address the incentives to share private information about uncertain market demand that is common to every …rm. Fried (1984) , Shapiro (1986) and Armantier and Richard (2003) analyze incentives to exchange information about private cost that is idiosyncratic to each …rm. 8 Our paper, in contrast, considers the sharing of customerspeci…c transaction records and its implications for dynamic price discrimination. 9 As in our paper, the literature on behavior-based price discrimination considers how the information gleaned from past sales record can reveal customer-speci…c preferences, which can be used as a basis to practice personalized pricing, and its impact on market outcomes such as consumer-and producer surplus. 10 Acquisti and Varian (2005) consider a setting in which rational consumers with constant valuations for the goods purchase from a monopoly merchant who can commit to a pricing policy. They show that although it is feasible to price so as to distinguish high-value and low-value consumers from advances in information 6 See Gupta and Lehmann (2003) for more details about CDNow case and the value of customers. 7 See Banal-Estanol (2007) for an analysis of horizontal mergers that explicitly takes into account the sharing of private information of merging parties. However, the nature of private information is about uncertain demands or costs as in the existing information sharing literature. 8 There have also been studies on the incentives to share credit information among …nancial intermediaries. technology, the merchant will never …nd it optimal to do so, echoing the results from the prior literature on dynamic price discrimination. 11 They then extend their model to allow the seller to o¤er enhanced services to previous customers and …nd that conditioning prices on purchase history can be pro…table. 12 Chen (1997), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , and
Taylor (2003), in contrast, consider a duopolistic setting with competition to analyze the implications of price discrimination based on purchase history. Unlike previous works on behavior-based price discrimination, our innovation in this paper is to allow the possibility that product o¤erings can be either substitutes or complements. The existing literature typically assumes that the relationship between products is one of the two types, and that this relationship is known to the …rms that make strategic choices. One notable exception is Gentzkow (2007) who explicitly analyzes the possibility that product o¤erings can be either substitutes or complements as in our paper. Even though our paper and Gentzkow's share the same basic premise, the focus of his paper is very di¤erent from ours. He is mainly concerned with developing a new econometric technique to estimate the impact of new goods that accounts for the possibility that the new goods can be complements to the existing goods.
Liu and Serfes (2006) is closest to our paper in that it also takes a step in the direction of examining the …rms' incentives to share their customer-speci…c information with other …rms. They consider a Hotelling model in which each …rm can collect detailed customer information about their own customers, indexed by a precise location in the Hotelling model. With information sharing, …rms can practice perfect price discrimination against not only their own previous customers, but also the consumers who bought from rival …rms.
However, there is one key di¤erence in the main qualitative results. In Liu and Serfes, neither …rm …nds it pro…table to share information when …rms have equal customer bases.
The incentive to share information arises only when there is enough asymmetry in their market shares. In such a case, the sharing of information takes the form of a one-way transaction in which the …rm with the smaller customer base sells its information to the …rm with the larger customer base while the "big" …rm never has incentives to sell its information to the smaller rival …rm. In our model, however, the information sharing takes place between symmetrically positioned …rms. In addition, the relationship between the two 1 1 This is due to strategic demand reduction by sophisticated consumers. See Stokey (1979) . …rms is always competitive and the pooling of information does not reveal any information about the relationship (complements or substitutes) between the two products in Liu and Serfes (2006) , whereas the revelation of this relationship is a key aspect in our framework.
Liu and Serfes and our paper complement each other in that we explore the incentives to share information in the …rms'quest for qualitative improvement of information, while they study the same issue from the …rms'strategic incentives to enlarge the information base.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model.
In section 3, we derive the market equilibrium in the presence of information sharing and analyze how information sharing can be used as a basis for behavior-based price discrimination. Section 4 analyzes the market equilibrium in the absence of information sharing. In section 5, we analyze incentives to share information and the impact of information sharing on consumer welfare. In section 6, we discuss a couple of interesting implications that can be drawn from our simple framework and check the robustness of our main results. Section 7 concludes.
The Basic Model
Consider two goods, A and B; respectively produced by …rm A and …rm B, that consumers may regard either as complements or as substitutes depending on their preferences. For simplicity and analytical tractability, we consider only two distinct groups of consumers: one group of consumers in proportion , called group C, regard the two goods as complements and the other group of consumers in proportion (1 ), called group S, consider them substitutes. 13 The proportion is common knowledge, where 2 (0; 1).
The model is a two-period setting in which each consumer purchases at most one unit of each good per period. Each …rm is able to keep track of individual transaction records of its customers. In particular, this assumption implies that at the end of the …rst period, each …rm knows whether or not a particular consumer has bought a unit of its own good in the …rst period. This information allows each …rm to engage in behavior-based price discrimination in the second period, that is, charging di¤erent prices to consumers with di¤erent purchase histories.
Let us denote a consumer's purchase decision by (a; b), where a and b respectively refer to decisions concerning products A and B with 1 representing the purchase of the relevant product and 0 representing no purchase. A consumer's purchase history in the …rst period Within each group of consumers (C or S), we assume heterogeneity of preferences.
More speci…cally, a consumer of type in group C has the following net surpluses from each possible choices in each period.
if both A and B are purchased if only good i is purchased if neither one is purchased (1) where p i denotes …rm i's price for i = A; B and the superscript C indicates that the consumer belongs to group C. The type parameter represents the consumer's reservation value for the pair of products viewed as complementary. We assume that is distributed 1 4 Variables associated with the regime of no information sharing are denoted with a tilde.
over an interval [ ; ] with distribution and density functions of F ( ) and f ( ), respectively, where 0 : The consumer in group C does not derive any bene…t from consuming only one good, thus earning the utility of p i when only one good is purchased. The utility from buying neither A nor B is normalized to zero.
On the other hand, the consumers in group S are heterogeneous with respect to their relative preferences for B over A: We capture this consumer heterogeneity with the parameter . More precisely, we assume that consumer type 's reservation values for goods
with a positive value of indicating that the consumer prefers good B to good A. 15 Let G( ) and g( ) denote the distribution and the density of ; respectively. For simplicity, we also assume that G is symmetric about zero, with = > 0. A consumer in group S has the following surplus from each possible choice.
if both A and B are purchased if only good i is purchased if neither one is purchased (2) where the superscript S indicates that the consumer belongs to group S. The consumer in group S; who regards the two goods as substitutes, earns a net surplus of maxfv A ; v B g p A p B from buying both A and B; the utility of buying only good i is set to be v i p i :
We assume that v is high enough to ensure that each consumer in this group buys at least one unit of either A or B. 16 The utility from no purchase is set to zero.
Both …rms have the same constant unit-cost of production, d: Finally, F and G satisfy the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition:
increasing in and , respectively, 17 which ensures the …rst-order condition for optimization to be su¢ cient for the second-order condition.
Finally, we assume that a consumer belongs to the same group over the two periods; that 1 5 The same framework for the horizontal product di¤erentiation is used in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) . 1 6 This model speci…cation is somewhat restrictive in that we do not allow the consumers in group S to opt for no purchase. The qualitative results of this paper, however, are robust to the relaxation of this assumption, which will be discussed in section 6. is, the group characteristics are a …xed trait. However, we assume that parameters and are independently drawn from their distributions in each period. This allows us to isolate the strategic incentives to share information concerning consumers'preferences towards the products without being concerned with the issue of customer poaching and/or personalized pricing within the same group, which has been extensively studied in the literature [see Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , Taylor (2003 Taylor ( , 2004 , and Acquisti and Varian (2005)]. In fact, our focus in this paper is on the ex post incentive to share information and we abstract from strategic demand manipulation by consumers in the …rst period to elicit a better price in the second period. We will discuss conditions under which consumers behave myopically in section 6. This implies that …rms can identify the group identity of each consumer if they exchange customer information at the end of the …rst period.
Sharing of Customer Information
If …rms exchange their customer lists acquired through the …rst-period marketing, they are able to draw inferences about customers'preferences towards the two products. This implies that they are able to charge di¤erent prices in the second period, depending on whether consumers consider the two products substitutes or complements. Consequently, the two groups of consumers are segmented and each …rm plays noncooperative pricing games in two separate markets.
The market for group C consumers
We …rst consider the consumers who consider the two goods complementary. It is a standard result that the two …rms setting prices independently charge too much overall from the collective viewpoint of the …rms. This is due to the externality problem, noted by Cournot (1838), with two distinct …rms acting independently as a monopolist of each complementary good. The two …rms could have obtained a higher pro…t if they had cooperatively lowered their individual prices as if they were a merged monopolist. This ine¢ ciency arises because the independent …rms do not internalize the interdependence of their pricing strategies, whereas the merged …rm does. 18 Consumer surplus also increases with a merged monopolist due to a lowered total price for the goods. 19 Let us brie ‡y show that this classic result applies to the market for group C consumers. 20 The optimal decision for consumers in group C can be characterized by a simple cut-o¤ rule: 
where
denotes the threshold consumer who is indi¤erent between the two choices. Those with buy both goods since their willingness to pay for a pair of complements is greater than or equal to the total price for the two goods, while those with < buy neither due to a relatively low reservation value for consuming the two complementary goods. The demand for each good is thus given by 1 F ( ). Firm i's pro…t maximization problem can be written as
The …rst-order condition with respect to each …rm's full information price, p C i ; yields
for i = A; B and i 6 = j: The two …rst-order conditions implicitly de…ne each …rm's bestresponse function whose slope, dp i =dp j (i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j); is negative and its absolute value is less than one. 21 This implies that two responses meet each other at most once where we …nd a unique, stable, symmetric Nash equilibrium that is implicitly de…ned by
On the other hand, an integrated monopolist would have solved the following pro…t 1 9 Clearly, this case is still not the …rst-best outcome: the price with the integrated monopolist is still above the total marginal cost.
2 0 In a similar vein, an integrated upstream licensor holding patents for several complementary technologies can charge a cheaper total price compared to the case of separate patent holders for each innovation. This suggests a welfare-enhancing role for patent pools in case of complementary technologies. See Lerner and Tirole (2004) for a formal discussion of this issue. 2 1 The total di¤erentiation to (5) shows dpi=dpj = 1
where P m denotes the total price for a pair of the two goods under monopoly. The …rst-order condition for this problem yields
and thus
By comparing (5) and (8), we …nd that the left-hand-side of (8) evaluated at the price of P m = 2p C becomes negative, which implies that the integrated monopolist charges less than the sum of prices independent …rms would charge in duopoly, and that the pro…t associated with the monopoly case is larger than the sum of two …rms'pro…ts under duopoly. 22 Figure   1 shows the relationship of p C and p m (= P m =2) graphically. ; and thus one …rm is required to charge the price of 1 4 and receives a pro…t of 1 8 . However, with two …rms competing non-cooperatively, the equilibrium price that each …rm charges is 1 3 and each one's pro…t becomes 
The market for group S consumers
A consumer who regards the two goods as substitutes buys a unit of either A or B. 23 The consumer will compare the net surplus of each choice and choose the good that yields a higher surplus. The optimal decision rule is given by
where p S B p S A : 24 Since the demand for …rm A is G( ); the optimization problem for …rm A in the market of substitutes is given by
The …rst-order condition for this problem yields
A marginal increase in the price of good A leads to an increase in the mark-up for the inframarginal consumers of good A; which is represented by the …rst term G(p S B p S A ): However, …rm A loses some consumers at the margin to …rm B because of the marginal increase in p S A ; which is captured by the second term,
The bestresponse of p A to a given p B describes …rm A's optimal price with this trade-o¤ considered.
In a similar manner, we can derive the best-response function of …rm B:
The equilibrium price is uniquely determined because the best responses have positive slopes that are less than one. 25 The symmetric equilibrium price of p S A = p S A = p S is given by
The mark-up in the market of substitutes is represented by 1=2g(0). Given the assumption that is distributed symmetrically around zero, a larger value of g(0) indicates that 2 3 In Appendix A, we show this claim rigorously. 2 4 This tie-breaking rule is inconsequential because here we consider a continuum of consumers so that the point mass of critical consumers is zero. 2 5 Similarly to the case of complements, the application of the implicit function theorem to the …rst order condition yields dp A dp B
2 G g 0 =g 2 > 0 and dp A dp B < 1 because the MHR condition implies 1 G g 0 =g
consumers'preferences are more concentrated around zero and that they have less diverse preferences for the goods. We can thus interpret the reciprocal of 2g(0) as the degree of heterogeneity in consumers'relative preferences towards the two substitute products, which plays a role similar to the transportation cost (or product di¤erentiation) parameter in the standard Hotelling model.
The following lemma summarizes and compares the two equilibrium prices for each group, p C and p S :
Lemma 1 When each consumer's group identity (C or S) is revealed to the two …rms via information sharing, the full-information price for consumers in group C is characterized
and the full-information price for consumers in group S is given by p S = d + 1 2g(0) : Therefore, the relative magnitudes of these two prices depend on the distributions F and G: In particular, if the two goods are perceived to be highly di¤ erentiated for group S consumers (i.e., g(0) is low), p S will be higher than p C with all other things being equal.
Let C and S denote the equilibrium pro…ts in markets for consumer groups C and S, respectively. That is, C = (p C d)(1 F (2p C )) and S = 1=4g(0): With information sharing, each …rm's second-period total pro…t from both markets is given by
4 No Sharing of Customer Information
Bayesian updating about group identity
If …rms do not exchange their customer lists, each …rm only knows whether a particular consumer is a newcomer or a returning customer. However, each …rm is unaware of whether a consumer has bought from the other …rm or not. When a consumer is a newcomernot in its customer list at the beginning of the second-period -the seller can think of two possibilities: the consumer actually considered the two goods complementary but did not buy either good because of a relatively low willingness to pay for a pair of goods, or the consumer regarded the goods as substitutes and bought a good from the other …rm in the previous period. In a similar manner, facing a returning consumer already registered in its present customer list, the seller also can think of two possibilities: the consumer considered the goods complements and bought both goods, or the consumer considered the two goods substitutes and chose its own product over the rival's.
Each …rm will update its prior beliefs about the group identity of a particular consumer, based on his/her past purchase history. Following a Bayesian updating process, the posterior beliefs of …rm A can be derived as follows.
where 0 A and 1 A respectively denote …rm A's conditional probability that a newcomer and a returning consumer would belong to group C, and^ and^ denote the …rst-period thresholds for critical consumers, which depend on the …rst period prices charged by …rms A and B. Similarly, …rm B's posteriors are given as
where 0 B and 1 B denote …rm B's posteriors that a newcomer and a returning consumer would consider the two goods complementary.
Then, obviously, the posteriors 0 i and 1 i typically di¤er from the prior ; unless is either 1 or 0; for i = A; B: In other words, if a consumer's substitutability or complementarity between the product o¤erings by oligopolistic …rms is customer-speci…c, private information, …rms (sellers) will have di¤erent posterior beliefs about the group identify of a particular consumer based on the purchase history. This implies that …rms may post different prices to the consumers depending on whether a particular consumer is a newcomer or a returning customer, even without customer information sharing. 
Price competition in the second period
Let us describe the …rm's second-period pro…t maximization problem without information sharing. Let p 0 i and p 1 i denote the prices that …rm i posts for a newcomer and for a returning customer, respectively. Let us describe the …rm's second-period pro…t maximization problem without information sharing. Firm i expects a newcomer to consider the two goods complementary with probability 0 i ; and thus the newcomer will also be o¤ered the newcomer price from …rm j; for i 6 = j: In contrast, …rm i expects the newcomer to regard the goods as substitutes with the remaining probability 1 0 i ; and thus the newcomer will be o¤ered the price for a returning consumer from the other …rm, p 1 j : As a result, …rm A's pro…t maximization problem for a newcomer is given by
Similarly, the optimization problem for a returning consumer reads as M ax
We can easily describe …rm B's optimization problems as well. The symmetric equilibrium prices with no information sharing, p 0 and p 1 ; can be derived from these optimization problems. Each …rm's second-period total pro…t from two markets without information sharing is given by
where 0 and 1 denote the expected pro…t per newcomer and per returning consumer in equilibrium, respectively. Now we are ready to discuss the relationship between the second-period equilibrium prices with and without information sharing. Intuitively, the prices without information sharing, p 0 and p 1 ; will be located between the full information prices. In the presence of uncertainty about the group identity of a consumer, each …rm will post (weighted) average prices of the two full information prices in order to maximize its expected pro…ts. This is similar to the result that the …rms with incomplete information about demands or costs post a weighted average price to maximize their expected pro…t in either Cournot or Bertrand competition.
Lemma 2
The equilibrium prices without information sharing are between the full information prices, i.e., minfp C ; p S g < p 0 ; p 1 < maxfp C ; p S g for any , 0 1:
(See Appendix for the proof.)
To sum up, if the …rms share their customer information, they can charge two distinct full information prices, p C and p S ; according to the group identity. Without information sharing, the …rms post two di¤erent prices p 0 and p 1 that are averages of the two full information prices based on the consumer's past purchase history. Therefore, customer information sharing provides a more precise basis for the price discrimination in the second period.
Incentives to Share Information and E¤ects on Consumers
In this section, we analyze the …rms' incentives to share their customer information with the other …rms. One novel feature in our model is that the …rms with whom the customer information might be shared could be potential rivals in the substitutes market and at the same time partners in the complementary markets, depending on consumer types. We also study the e¤ect of information sharing on consumers from an antitrust perspective.
To share or not
In order to investigate the …rms'incentives to share information, we need to compare overall pro…ts over the two periods with and without information sharing, not only because sophisticated consumers who expect ex post discriminatory pricing, may strategically manipulate their demands, but also because the …rms might adopt strategic pricing in the …rst period, even without information sharing. In this section, let us …rst study ex post incentives to share information by comparing the second-period pro…ts only, and reserve more discussion about strategic considerations for section 6.
In the second period, we can think of two distinct cases according to the relative magnitudes of full information prices, p C and p S . 26 Let us …rst consider the case in which the full information price in the substitute market is lower than that of complementary goods,
i.e., p S < p C : Then, no information sharing with the average price mitigates the externality problem in the market of complements, as long as p S is so low that p 0 and p C are far below the joint-pro…t maximizing price, p m : Furthermore, average pricing softens competition in the substitute market where each …rm can extract more rents. 27 On both accounts, the …rms are better o¤ without information sharing.
Of course, if we consider the other case where the full information price in the substitute market is higher than that in the market of complements, information sharing leads to a higher pro…t in the exactly opposite manner: with information sharing, …rms can avoid the aggravation of the externality problem in the complementary market and extract more rents from the consumers who consider the goods substitutes.
Proposition 2 (Incentives to share information) If the full information price in the substitute market is lower than that of complementary goods, i.e., p S < p C ; and p S is not so low that p 0 and p 1 are far below the joint-pro…t maximizing price, p m ; then …rms have no incentive to share customer information. In the other case of p C < p S ; …rms can increase their pro…ts with information sharing.
The above proposition tells us that the incentives to share customer information depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences 2 6 If the prices for two groups are identical, i.e., p C = p S ; the issue of information sharing is no longer interesting. Each …rm has the same mark-up for both groups. The second-period pro…ts with and without information sharing become identical. 2 7 For this argument, we need to assume that those who regard the two goods as substitutes have a su¢ ciently high level of the intrinsic valuation of consumption, v: If not, the average prices, p 0 and p 1 ; that are higher than p S , may reduce the demand in the market of substitutes to such an extent that each …rm earns less pro…t relative to the full information case. towards the product o¤erings. If the products are not perceived as highly di¤erentiated substitutes to the extent of p S < p C ; it is indeed the uncertainty about consumers' preferences that makes the …rms better o¤. As far as a policy implication is concerned, our analysis shows that oligopolistic …rms' commitment to not sharing customer information -possibly emphasizing privacy concerns -can arise for a strategic reason. To put it differently, we may view the commitment to not sharing information as a possible device for tacit collusion. Another interesting implication for the policy-makers is that …rms may not always be worse o¤ even if information sharing is banned, because for the case of p S < p C the …rms will endogenously reside in the regime of no information sharing so that the regulation is not binding. Of course, in the other case of p S < p C , the prohibition of customer information sharing will decrease the …rms'pro…ts.
The e¤ects of information sharing on consumer surplus
We …nd that the e¤ects of customer information sharing on consumer surplus also depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of the full information prices. If the full information price in the substitute market is lower than that of complementary goods, i.e., p S < p C ; the consumers who consider the two goods complementary become bene…ciaries when customer information is not shared. This is because they pay less for a pair of both goods, relative to the full information case. In contrast, no information sharing hurts those who regard the goods as substitutes because the average prices, p 0 and p 1 ; are higher than the full information price, p S . For the other case of p C < p S ; those in group C prefer information sharing while those in group S do not.
Proposition 3 (Consumer surplus) If the full information price in the substitute market is lower than that of complementary goods, i.e., p S < p C ; customer information sharing increases the surplus of those who regard the goods as substitutes. In contrast, the consumers who regard the goods as complements prefer no sharing of their past transactions data. For the other case of p C < p S ; those in group C prefer information sharing while those in group S are better o¤ under no sharing regime.
Our analysis shows that there exist con ‡icts of interests between di¤erent groups of consumers. Some consumers resist customer information sharing, aside from privacy concerns, due to its role in price discrimination, while others want their purchase history to be shared between the …rms in order to receive a better deal. Therefore, we cannot say that information sharing always makes all consumers worse o¤ or better o¤ in the presence of uncertainty about consumers'preferences. Therefore, a ban on information sharing because of antitrust concerns can be counterproductive.
6 More Implications and Robustness Check
More Implications of Our Research
Our innovation in this paper is to allow the possibility that product o¤erings can be either substitutes or complements across consumers. Fortunately, this novelty also provides interesting implications beyond the issues directly related to customer-speci…c information exchange. The new insights suggested in this section are to await further research; here we brie ‡y provide the intuitive explanations.
Product di¤erentiation and informational regime
The intuition for our main result provides a new perspective on the determinants of the degree of product di¤erentiation. The standard result in the literature is that …rms typically realize higher pro…ts from more di¤erentiated products when they compete with substitutes, because …rms can mitigate competition by di¤erentiating their product from those of their rivals. 28 When products are complementary for some consumers, however, there exists an opposing force that potentially reduces the incentives for higher product di¤erentiation. If the full information price in the substitute market is higher than that of the complementary market and information sharing is prohibited, then greater product di¤erentiation aggravate the externality problem in the complementary market because it causes the prices without information sharing to deviate further away from the optimum. As a result, …rms face a trade-o¤ between higher pro…ts associated with highly di¤erentiated goods in the substitute market and the loss of pro…ts in the complementary market from the aggravated externality problem. This implies that the informational regime in which …rms reside can in ‡uence their choice of product di¤erentiation. 29 
Middlemen as information aggregators
The model in this paper analyzes direct exchange of customer information between …rms in the market. Our analysis, however, also has interesting implications for other channels of information aggregation. For example, this paper suggests a new role for middlemen 30 -the intermediaries between the seller of a good and its potential buyers -as information aggregators. If the direct exchange of customer information between …rms is prohibited due to privacy concerns or antitrust regulation, the presence of middlemen, such as internet retailers Amazon, eBay, and Google check-out, can bene…t …rms and consumers by functioning as lawful institutions that facilitate information aggregation. This role of middlemen, to our best knowledge, has not been addressed yet.
Middlemen are expected to play various roles in the markets with trade frictions and/or imperfect information. They can lower transaction costs or serve as experts in certifying the quality characteristics of goods. 31 In addition to these traditional roles, middlemenespecially information technology (IT)-focused, or internet-based -may well be information aggregators who are very e¢ cient in collecting, storing, and managing customer information.
Database co-ops and the M&A for customer information
This paper considers the situation in which consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their relationship to product o¤erings, and the relationship -the degree of complementarity -is consumer-speci…c, private information unknown to …rms. In such circumstances, we have shown that each …rm's customer list can become more valuable to each …rm when integrated with those of other …rms. In other word, the information pooling generates informational economies of scale. This helps us to understand how customer information can be valuable as a tradeable asset. In this aspect, our analysis provides legitimacy for new business practices such as database co-ops. In one example, a prospective member …rm is required to contribute at least 5000 names in order to join the Abacus 2B2 alliance. 32 This paper provides an explanation for how and when the bene…ts from such customer information exchange can arise.
In a similar vein, our study has important implications for the merger analysis in which the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another …rm's customer lists. Even if a merger does not lead to higher market-power or cost-synergies by eliminating some duplications in production or marketing, it can be a pro…table strategy because of the value of customer lists. In reality, we can often observe M&As arising from such a motive. The CDNow case brie ‡y described in the Introduction is a case in point. Our study provides a theoretical foundation for the M&A of a …rm whose only asset is its customer lists in the context of behavior-based price discrimination. 33 
The Robustness of the Results
As previously mentioned, sophisticated consumers who expect ex post price discrimination may strategically misrepresent their preferences in order to increase their overall surplus, which leads us to check the conditions under which our main results are robust with such considerations. We also discuss the assumption that the substitute market is fully-covered to check the robustness of our main results.
Potential strategic misrepresentation of preferences by Group S Consumers
As previously shown, if the full information price in the substitute market is higher than that in the complementary market, i.e., p C < p S ; then each …rm has ex post incentive to share its customer purchase history with the other …rms. Then, the sophisticated consumers who consider the two goods substitutes may strategically buy both goods or neither, instead of buying only one good, in order to avoid the expected higher second-period price p S . Needless to say, the decision for this strategic demand manipulation hinges upon the bene…t-cost analysis associated with such possible mimicries. The bene…t of pretending to consider the goods complementary is a lower second-period price than the price without such a disguise, while its cost is a potential loss of utility in the …rst period.
More speci…cally, the consumer in group S can have additional bene…t of (p S p C ) by strategically purchasing either both goods or neither good instead of buying only one good.
By doing so, however, this consumer may enjoy less surplus in the …rst period because she now buys an additional good without further utility earned or loses the …rst-period utility, maxfv A ; v B g q i ; that could have been earned if the consumer had not strategically chosen no purchase. As a result, the consumer will not misrepresent her preference by buying both goods if the …rst-period price for a unit of good is su¢ ciently high due to a large marginal cost, d. Similarly, the consumer will not engage in the misrepresentation of her preference by opting for no purchase if the potential loss of utility in the …rst period is large enough due to a su¢ ciently high reservation value v.
Potential strategic misrepresentation of preferences by Group C Consumers
If the full information price in the substitute market is lower than that in the complementary market, i.e., p S < p C ; the sophisticated consumers expect no information sharing in the second period. So, they know that the second period prices will be based only on whether they are newcomers or returning customers. In such a case, a consumer's consumption decision in group C will be based not only on the …rst period surplus but also on its subsequent e¤ect on the second period price. Speci…cally, the consumer with have overall expected surplus of ( 2q) + E maxf 2p 1 ; 0g from buying both goods in the …rst period and will then face the price for a returning consumer in the second period, while E maxf 2p 0 ; 0g from not purchasing in the …rst period and then receiving the newcomer price in the second period.
With these dynamics taken into account, the …rst-period price in equilibrium -and thus the two …rms' overall pro…ts -may di¤er from that with myopic consumers. Since two …rms post a weighted average price between p S and p C ; it is no wonder that there exist two forces that in ‡uence the …rms'…rst period pro…ts in the opposite direction. An increase in the …rst-period price aggravates the externality problem in the complementary market, but allows more rent extraction from the substitute market; a decrease in the …rst-period price diminishes the externality problem, but it also reduces the rent from the substitute market. Due to these countervailing e¤ects, we cannot unabmiguously assert how the potential strategic misrepresentation of preferences by the consumers in group C would a¤ect …rst-period pricing and, subsequently, the …rms' ex ante incentive to share customer information. We believe, however, that our qualitative results derived from ex post perspective also extend to the case where we consider such strategic concerns, with some restrictions on distributions, the proportion parameter, or the discount factor.
On the other hand, a consumer who considers the two goods substitutes knows that she will face the price for a returning customer if she buys a good from the same …rm, but the price for a newcomer if she switches to the other …rm in the second period. Since she is not informed of her second-period preference, indexed by ; at the beginning of period one, there is no dynamic e¤ect of the ex post discriminatory prices on the …rst-period choice.
This is similar to the case of the changing preference in the two-period poaching model of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
Not fully-covered substitute market
In our basic model, every consumer who regards the two goods as substitutes buys at least a unit of either A or B with the assumption that the common reservation price v is high enough to ensure that the substitute market is fully covered. Clearly, this assumption simpli…es the analysis to a signi…cant extent because the sharing of information allows …rms to identify consumer preferences for all consumers. This assumption may sound somewhat restrictive, but our qualitative result turns out to be robust to relaxing this assumption.
To see this point, suppose that consumers are also heterogeneous in the vertical dimension -with respect to their reservation price v i -so that the possibility of no purchase is open to those who have relatively low reservation values for both goods. Then, even if the …rms share their customer information collected through the initial marketing period, there will be residual uncertainty about consumer preferences. Meeting a consumer who bought neither product, …rms cannot tell if the consumer has considered the goods complementary but did not buy either good due to a relatively low , or if the consumer has regarded the goods as substitutes but chose not to purchase either product due to a relatively low valuation for both goods. As a result, the …rms must post a weighted average price for unidenti…ed consumers even after information sharing. As far as identi…ed consumers are concerned, however, the incentives to share customer information work in the same manner as in the case of perfect identi…cation.
In fact, it must be more realistic to consider this possibility of no purchase; it only comes at the expense of substantial complication. If our simplifying assumption is relaxed, the demand of those who regard the goods as substitutes depends not only on horizontal, but also vertical, dimensions. The model incorporating this feature su¤ers from technical complexity without gaining any signi…cant additional insight. The bene…ts associated with our simple basic model outweigh its costs.
Concluding Remarks
We live in a world where electronic commerce through the Internet prevails more than ever before, numerous innovations in information-technology take place rapidly, consumers' records of previous purchases can be easily traced and stored by electronic "…ngerprints,"
and the issues related to privacy concerns are heard and discussed daily. Our analysis for customer information sharing is especially relevant in such a modern business environment.
In this paper, we have investigated oligopolistic …rms'incentives to share customer information about past purchase history and the e¤ects of information sharing on consumer surplus in a situation where …rms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer regards the product o¤erings as complements or substitutes.
The key intuition of this paper has several important implications not only for the issues directly related to customer information sharing, but also for other signi…cant subjects such as the determinants of product di¤erentiation and the roles of middlemen. Additionally, this paper sheds a new light on merger analysis in which the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another …rm's customer lists. Our research is an early step which we hope will encourage more research in this direction. Proof of Lemma 2. Preliminaries for proof. Recall the …rst-order conditions for p C and p S which are respectively given by
and
The …rst-order condition for p 0 A ; given …rm B's equilibrium prices p 0 and p 1 ; yields Proof. For the equilibrium prices without sharing of customer information, p 0 and p 1 ; to be between the two full information prices, several conditions must be satis…ed simultaneously. Let us …rst consider the case p C < p S : Then, for p C < p 0 and p C < p 1 ; the …rst bracketed term in (P3) and the second bracketed term in (P4) are negative due to (P1) and which in turn necessiates the positive second bracketed term in (P3) and the positive …rst bracketed term in (P4). These conditions are mathematically put as:
Given the above, we need to show that both p 0 and p 1 are below p S ; that is, maxfp 0 ; p 1 g < p S : If p 0 < p 1 ; the following inequalities hold:
because of (P6), (P5), and (P2), which consequently veri…es that the equilibrium prices without information sharing are between the two full information prices. For the other case of p 0 < p 1 ; we have the following result:
once again because of (P6), (P5) and (P2). Symmetrically, it can be shown that the equilibrium prices without information sharing are between the two full information prices for the other possibility of p S < p C : Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider the case of p S p i p C : The pro…ts with and without customer information sharing are then arranged such that i C and i S ; as long as p i is not extremely low, where i = 0; 1: With the symmetry of distribution G; each …rm has half of the market of substitutes, i.e., G(b ) = 1=2: The second-period pro…t with no information sharing is decomposed into
which satis…es the following inequality:
Therefore, the pro…t without information sharing is at least as high as the pro…t with information sharing.
For the other case of p C p i p S ; the relative magnitudes of prices are such that i C and i S : In a similar manner, the second-period pro…t with no information sharing is shown to be less than or equal to that with information sharing as follows.
Q.E.D.
